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Recent empirical studies point to the need for a model of bilateral market power between
health plans and provider organizations. We develop such a model and use it to analyze the
impact on cost and access of alternative contractual relationships between plans and providers.
The plans differentiate themselves through distinct, albeit overlapping, provider networks of
specialized, complementary inputs (physician groups and hospitals).  We analyze subgame
perfect strategic pricing equilibria for a range of possible contractual relationships between the
upstream providers and the downstream insurers, including different internal organizational
structures of vertically integrated health plans, such as group- and staff-model HMOs and PPOs.
A decentralized market structure produces inefficiencies from pricing coordination failures.
Integration may be able to overcome pricing inefficiencies, with performance affected by the
internal organization of vertically integrated health plans. Providers and MCOs do not achieve
maximum net revenue when they are monopolies or monopsonies, but rather at an intermediate
level of market power.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: I11.
KEYWORDS: Managed care, Networks, Provider Integration, Industrial Organization of
Health Care2
1. Introduction
The rise of managed health care organizations has transformed health care delivery and insurance
in the US.
1  Managed care encompasses a tremendous variety of structures. Nevertheless, one defining
feature is the insurer’s restriction of patient choice to a designated network of health care providers.  This
feature sets the stage for strategic vertical relations to arise between insurers—the managed care
organizations (MCOs)—and health care providers.
Empirical evidence certainly supports the view that vertical relations in the health care industry
affect the cost of health care services.  Cutler, McClellan and Newhouse (2000) examine the treatment of
heart disease in MCOs and traditional insurance, and find that the 30 to 40 percent lower expenditures of
MCOs are almost overwhelmingly attributable to lower unit prices, rather than differences in treatments
or health outcomes.  Studying eight medical conditions, Altman, Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) find that a
large fraction of the 40-percent lower expenditures (compared to indemnity insurance) comes from MCOs
paying lower prices for the same services.  In a study of hospital-physician integration, Cuellar and
Gertler (2001) conclude that exclusive arrangements have an important effect on costs.
Major problems arise, however, in drawing general inferences from these empirical studies.
Health economics lacks a clearly articulated analysis that identifies how different contractual relationships
between health care providers and MCOs affect the cost of health care.  There are several challenges to
developing such an analysis.  First, the strategic relationships between upstream providers and
downstream insurers in the health care industry differ markedly from the traditional textbook analyses of
vertical relations, which assume, usually for analytical tractability, that there is a monopoly on at least one
side of the relationship.  Such an assumption is at odds with the facts.   Health care providers and MCOs
are imperfectly competitive, with both sides able to exercise market power and make strategic decisions
on pricing and contractual relations.
                                                                
1 Whereas before the 1980s fee-for-service indemnity insurance was predominant, by 1993 almost three-quarters of
all insured Americans were enrolled in some form of managed care (Glied 2000), and by 1999 fewer than one in ten
Americans with employer-sponsored insurance had traditional indemnity insurance (Dudley and Luft 2001).3
A second challenge arises from the distinctive nature of specialization in the health care industry.
The service of a particular doctor or hospital, unlike a traditional upstream input such as oil or steel, has
unique characteristics.  Also, the services of differentiated providers upstream create downstream MCOs
that consumers and organized purchasers also perceive to be differentiated.  As a result, as Gaynor and
Vogt (2000) have aptly observed, what is needed to understand the health care industry is a model of
“bilateral oligopoly.” Empirical studies confirm the need for such a model. Feldman and Wholey (2001)
conclude their study of HMO monopsony power by emphasizing “the need for different models” since
“the markets for hospital and physician services may be organized differently [from standard models]”;
“it seems plausible to us that the relation between medical groups and HMOs should be modeled as an
example of bilateral (two-way) market power” (p.20).
In this paper we develop just such a model of bilateral oligopoly that captures many of the
distinctive features of vertical relations in the health care industry.  The analysis builds upon and extends
the work of Pepall and Norman (2001).  We begin by assuming that insurers are organized as managed
care organizations (MCOs) and that these competing organizations differentiate themselves by creating
distinct, but overlapping, health care provider networks.  The degree to which consumers perceive MCOs
to be differentiated significantly affects the impact of different contractual arrangements on cost and
access to health care. An important feature of our analysis is that we allow this degree of perceived
differentiation between MCOs to vary. This allows us to examine the incentives that different health
provider groups have explicitly to differentiate their services or their brands from those of their rivals.
Our focus on perceived differentiation makes the model readily applicable to analyzing the trend toward
expanded consumer and employer choice in health care.
Our approach is very different from earlier work on vertical relations between upstream providers
and downstream insurers in the health industry, such as Gal-Or (1999), in that we investigate the
important complementary relationship between the upstream health service providers.  That is, we allow
for alliances of specialized, complementary upstream providers, such as physician groups and hospitals.4
Premium competition has long been advocated as a way to increase “value for money” in health
care (Enthoven 1993). We show that the outcome of premium competition among MCOs is determined
by the vertical relations between the upstream providers and the downstream MCOs and by the degree to
which consumers perceive the competing MCOs to be offering differentiated health care services.  But
this is a two-way street.  The contractual relationships that are likely to be adopted by providers and
MCOs will themselves be affected by the strength of premium competition.  Our primary goal in this
paper, therefore, is to investigate this interaction between the contractual relationships between the
upstream providers and the downstream insurers and the cost of and access to health care.  The
contractual relationships that we analyze include horizontal alliances among upstream providers as well
as more vertically integrated organizations found in HMO and PPO models.  These cases capture many of
the features of the diverse organizational forms in health care ranging from loose “virtual integration”
(Robinson and Casalino 1996) to centralized vertical integration such as in staff-model HMOs.
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we develop the model of competing
MCOs with overlapping provider networks.  We then analyze strategic pricing equilibria under several
alternative market structures, beginning in section 3 with the benchmark case of decentralized, or arms-
length, contracting between insurers and providers. Section 4 considers horizontal upstream integration in
the form of overlapping physician-hospital alliances and an overall provider consortium while section 5
analyzes partial vertical integration. Under partial vertical integration we allow for differing degrees of
autonomy or “power” for providers within the integrated MCO, comparing strong provider autonomy in
what we label a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) with staff- and group-model HMOs.  Section 6
provides a comparison of the manner in which the different organizational structures affect access to and
cost of health care.
2. The Model: Competing MCOs with Overlapping Provider Networks.
2
                                                                
2 To assist anyone interested in applying the model to other questions in the industrial organization of health care,
we have made the underlying Mathematica code for solving the model available at http://www.tufts.edu/~gnorman/.
We request only that you cite our work when using the model.5
The upstream market of health providers consists of two physician groups,  j= 1,2, and two
hospitals,  k = 1 ¢, 2 ¢, each offering services that are compatible with the other group and that are
differentiated or specialized.
3 For example, the two physician groups could employ different physicians or
could differ in the mix of medical specialties covered.  The hospitals could differ in location or could
specialize in different kinds of inpatient services. Physicians and hospitals are complementary inputs into
health care.  Different combinations of them produce differentiated health care services.  That is, a
particular surgeon working in a particular hospital potentially delivers a different outcome than having the
same surgeon working in a different hospital.
In the era of managed care the common form of payment to health service providers is capitation,
a bundled prepayment per enrollee per time period. Capitation payment is prevalent among some kinds of
physicians (e.g., primary care providers) and some regions (e.g., California, Pennsylvania) (Dudley and
Luft 2001). In California in 1998, 63 percent of HMOs paid primary care providers through capitation.
For hospital services, bundled prepayments often take the form of prospective payment per admission,
such as payment based on Diagnosis Related Groups. However, capitation payment of hospitals has been
used.
4 In addition, physician-hospital organizations often compete for “global capitation” payment for
physician and hospital services.  Here we assume capitation payment for all upstream health service
providers.  However, since we abstract from the incentive effects of alternative payment systems, our
results do not depend on this assumption.  We show in Appendix A, for example, that the analysis can
also encompass fee-for-service and intermediate forms of mixed payment.  What does matter is the scope
of the services covered by capitation: that is, the degree to which a physician group and hospital jointly
negotiate a “global” capitation rate or set their fees.
                                                                
3 For simplicity of exposition, we label the upstream providers physician groups and hospitals; but the model applies
to any combination of complementary specialized inputs—nurses, other physician aids, or even pharmaceuticals and
medical equipment—that are combined to produce differentiated downstream health care products.
4 For example, PacifiCare Health Systems in California asked enrollees to choose a hospital for inpatient care, if
needed. PacifiCare then paid the hospital a fixed payment for each enrollee who chose it. In 1998, such hospital
capitation arrangements covered over 90 percent of PacifiCare’s California enrollees, although many hospitals
subsequently withdrew from these arrangements (Dudley and Luft 2001).6
The prices, or capitation rates, paid to the upstream health providers are denoted by vj and vk, j ˛ {1, 2}, k
˛ {1¢, 2¢}, with v = (v1, v2, v1¢, v2¢).   We assume that the physician services of group j are produced at a
constant marginal cost of cj, and that hospital k produces inpatient services at constant marginal cost ck.
For simplicity we assume that the marginal costs of all the upstream providers are equal, and so can be
normalized to zero without loss of generality: cj = ck = 0, j ˛ {1, 2}, k ˛ {1¢, 2¢}.
The upstream providers deliver health services for an MCO, which acts as an insurer competing
in the downstream market for buyers of health care plans. Figure 1 describes the basic setup. The
upstream providers are shown in the circle nodes distinguished by primed and unprimed values: the circle
nodes 1’ and 2’ are the two suppliers of hospital services while 1 and 2 are the two suppliers of physician
services.  Thus, the downstream sector has four MCOs, shown in the squared nodes, each differentiated
by the physician and hospital services it offers.  There is an MCO offering the health care services
provided by a combination of physician group 1 with hospital 1’; another offering the services provided
by physician group 1 and hospital 2’; a third offering the services provided by combining physician group
2 and hospital 1’; and a fourth offering the combination of 2 with 2’.
(Insert Figure 1 here)
To deliver one unit of health care service to an enrollee an MCO requires the input of one unit of
physician service and one unit of hospital service. That is, there is a constant returns to scale, fixed
proportion production technology in providing health care services. Under capitation the MCO prepays
for the services of the health care providers, and so the risk of enrollee illness is shifted from the MCO to
the upstream health providers. For simplicity, we assume that the risk factor of each enrollee is the same;
that is, each enrollee becomes ill with probability r , and requires then one unit of health care service.  As
long as we assume that enrollee risk is observable, the model could be extended to allow for risk
heterogeneity among enrollees.  In that case the negotiated capitation rate for health care providers would
be risk adjusted to account for differing patients’ expected costs.   That is, the capitation payment to7
provider j for enrollee with risk i, vij, would be individually risk adjusted according to i r . Thus, a health
care provider would receive a larger payment for an elderly diabetic than for a healthy 20-year-old.
The assumption of observable risk obviates the problem of adverse selection,
5 allowing us to
focus on the strategic pricing issues that arise independently of adverse selection or risk selection in
health care markets. Extending this framework to examine interactions with selection, particularly when
enrollees value provider choice and valuation of choice is correlated with health cost risk, is left to future
research.
The MCOs compete for enrollees in one of two ways.  The four plans could constitute the health
insurance options offered by a payer, such as a large employer or a government program.
6 Alternatively,
the four MCOs could compete for employers who are seeking a single plan to offer to their employees.
The plans would then be competing for employer contracts.  In either case, the number of enrollees in an
MCO depends on its premium, the premiums quoted by the competing MCOs, and the appeal of the
MCO’s differentiated providers to the enrollees.
Specifically, we assume that the demand for MCO (j; k)’s services depends upon the premium
that it charges, p(j;k), the premiums charged by other competing plans, p(j’;k’) , and the differentiated health
care provider network that it offers.  This relationship is represented by the following simple linear
function:
(1)  ( ) p p p q k j k j k j -
b
- - = ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; (
1
1 ) (p (j ˛ {1,2}; k ˛ {1¢, 2¢})
where p = (p(1;1¢), p(1;2¢), p(2;1¢), p(2;2¢)) and  ( ) 4 ) 2 ; 2 ( ) 1 ; 2 ( ) 2 ; 1 ( ) 1 ; 1 ( ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ + + + = p p p p p  . The parameter b
describes how differentiation or specialization of the health care provider network of an MCO affects
premium competition among the MCOs. The greater is b, the greater is the perceived degree of
                                                                
5 Alternatively we could allow for imperfect observability of risk, but assume that the combination of imperfect risk
adjustment and mixed payment reduces selection to a de minimus concern.
6 The payer would require all participating health plans to abide by various rules, which could be designed to
mitigate problems such as adverse selection. For example, the plans might be required to offer a standardized benefit
package with no pre-existing conditions clauses to all applicants (guaranteed issue and guaranteed renewability);8
differentiation, and so the greater is the degree of market power of any one plan. For example, when b is
high, enrollees or payers do not switch between plans readily, because the costs of switching—choosing a
new provider and the potential discontinuity of care—outweigh the benefit of paying a lower premium.
Many rural areas and several increasingly consolidated metropolitan areas seem to fit this description.  In
the limit when b ﬁ ¥ there is no competition among the MCOs and each one acts as a monopoly insurer.
By contrast, the smaller is b the greater is the perceived degree of substitutability among the
services provided by the MCOs, making it more likely that health care purchasers will “vote with their
feet” and switch to lower-premium plans. In other words, a low b means that the market is quite
competitive even with just a few competing health plans. Indeed, when bﬁ0 the plans are perceived as
perfect substitutes, and the four MCOs face a perfectly competitive market for insurance.
 This simple linear demand structure
7 allows us to examine how varying degrees of
competitiveness in the health care market affect access, defined here as total enrollment, total premium
spending, and the relative profitability of various kinds of provider integration. Given (1), access to health
care depends in our analysis on the premiums charged by the competing MCOs. The premiums in turn
depend upon how the MCO negotiates the prices of services provided by its upstream network of health
care providers.
Formally, we model downstream premium competition and upstream price competition as a two-
stage game.  In the first stage, each physician group and each hospital decides on the minimum price it
will accept from an MCO for a specified bundle of services (e.g., a capitation rate).  In the second stage,
each MCO sets its premium in light of the prices it must pay for physician and hospital services. We solve
for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to this two-stage price game.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
meet quality assurance criteria; report quality measures that are used in compiling “quality report cards” for
potential enrollees; and accept risk adjustment of premiums and provider payments.
7 An alternative demand specification popular in the industrial organizational literature is based on Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977). They model a representative consumer with a “taste for variety”. Consumer preferences for variety in the
health care market are, however, closer to the address approach in spatial models of differentiation, and the
parameter b captures the degree to which preferences are specialized.9
We begin with a benchmark case in which downstream insurers and upstream providers engage in
arms-length contracting or decentralized price setting. This case is characterized by inefficiencies arising
from coordination failures that might be expected to raise premiums, lower access and lower provider net
revenues. In subsequent sections we compare the benchmark case against a number of different
organizational forms characterized by varying degrees of horizontal and vertical integration. Our primary
interest is in whether integration lowers premium costs for a given quality of care and hence increases
access.  Extending the model to incorporate additional efficiency benefits from actual coordination of
health care processes (e.g., between inpatient and outpatient care) is left to future research.
3. The Benchmark Case of Arms Length Contracting
In the first stage of arms length contracting the physician groups set a capitation rate for their
services, vj, and hospitals choose a capitation rate for inpatient services, vk .  In the second stage, the
managed health care plans set premiums to maximize revenues net of the per-enrollee payments owed to
contracted providers. The outcome in the second stage is:
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } p v ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( max arg k j k j k j k j q v v p p - - =
* (j ˛ {1,2}; k ˛ {1¢, 2¢})
From the equilibrium premiums
8, p*(v), we can identify the derived demand functions that
upstream providers face in the first stage of the game. Let  ( ) v
*
j x , j ˛ {1,2} denote the total number of
MCO enrollees for which the physician group j is contracted to provide physician services. The demand
facing the physician group depends on enrollment in the two health plans with which the physician group
contracts.  Each hospital k derives its demand function  ( ) v
*
k x , k ˛ {1¢, 2¢} similarly.  As a result, each
upstream provider’s derived demand is:
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Note that the demand for each provider’s services depends upon the capitation rates set by the other
providers, so that providers compete with one another.  As is appropriate to health care, this competition
for patients is mediated by the health plan affiliation of the different providers.
9
In the first stage upstream providers of health care services set capitation rates to maximize net
revenue, defined as  ( ) v
* r - = P u u u u x c v ) ( , where  } 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 { ¢ ¢ ˛ u .
10  A higher capitation rate directly
raises revenues but also translates into higher costs for the downstream insurer and thus higher premiums,
leading to lower enrollments and lower capitation revenue for upstream providers.  In contracting with
plans, the upstream providers take account of the impact of their payments on plan enrollment. Recalling
that we have set cu = 0 for  } 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 { ¢ ¢ ˛ u , a provider’s net revenue simplifies to:
(4) ( ) v
* = P u u u x v . } 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 { ¢ ¢ ˛ u
Solving the first-order conditions from (3) and (4) gives the capitation rates charged by each
physician group and each hospital in the decentralized case:
(5) ( )
( ) 3 46 48
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Substituting (5) into the reaction functions (2) gives the premiums in the decentralized case:
(6) ( )
( )( ) 3 46 48 3 8
12 49 40 8
2
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) ; ( + b + b + b
+ b + b b
=
D
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As we might have expected, the equilibrium capitation rates and MCO premiums are increasing
functions of the perceived degree of differentiation among MCOs.  That is,  0 > ¶b ¶
D
u v  and
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
8 The assumption of Nash equilibrium behavior in premium competition has some empirical support. Studying the
small-group (50 or fewer employees) health insurance plan of California, Buchmueller and Town (2000) find that
MCO premium-setting is well described by Nash equilibrium behavior.
9 Providers compete to enroll the payer’s beneficiaries (e.g., the employees of the firm that offers this “menu” of
four competing health plans). The providers are not directly competing for inclusion within the network of a
particular plan.  One can think of this model as allowing providers to develop a provider-sponsored health plan if no
existing plan offers them a contract.
10 Although nonprofit ownership is prevalent in health care, evidence suggests that nonprofit behavior frequently
resembles net revenue maximization (Sloan 2000).  This can be consistent with not-for-profit objectives. For
example, a nonprofit provider may wish to use revenues from insured patients to provide uncompensated care to
poor and uninsured patients, or to fund public health and community outreach initiatives.11
0 ) ; ( > ¶b ¶
D
k j p . As b ﬁ 0, payers view the MCOs as being less differentiated.  This makes health insurer
premium competition tougher, squeezing profit margins for both MCOs and their contracting providers.
In the limit, if payers view hospitals and physician groups as perfect substitutes, the four MCOs are not
differentiated, and payers always choose the cheapest plan.  In this case the equilibrium provider fees and
premiums converge to marginal cost rc = 0. In other words, perfect competition results in equilibrium
premiums that are actuarially fair.
By contrast, as b ﬁ ¥, consumers and payers view MCOs as being increasingly differentiated by
virtue of their distinct provider networks. Premium competition in the health insurance market becomes
softer, allowing MCOs and their contracting providers to charge more generous mark-ups over marginal
cost.  As a result, in the model equilibrium premiums  6 5 ﬁ
*D




Intuition might also suggest that providers and insurers enjoy the largest net revenues when b ﬁ
¥, i.e., when MCOs are so highly differentiated that they are virtual monopolies.  This is not, however,
the case. Figure 2 shows that providers and insurers both enjoy highest net revenues at an intermediate
level of product differentiation among MCOs.  Note also that health care providers enjoy higher net
revenues than MCOs, thanks to their market power as suppliers of specialized services.
(Insert Figure 2 near here)
Competing forces lead to the pattern of profitability described in Figure 2.  At higher b, softer
premium competition among MCOs allows them to charge higher premiums, and physician groups and
hospitals share in the higher premiums through higher capitation payments. However, offsetting effects
arise from two sources of inefficiency in arms-length contracting. First, there is a horizontal externality in
the pricing of the capitation services vi. Hospitals and physician groups do not coordinate when setting
their rates.  Yet any reduction in payment that a physician group accepts from an MCO also benefits the
hospital contracting with that MCO, because lower provider payments allow the MCO to charge a more12
competitive premium and attract more enrollees. Greater enrollments in turn give the hospital a larger
volume of patients and revenues. Of course, this is a two-way street.  Hospitals similarly do not take into
account the benefits that the MCO’s contracted physician group derives from any discount the hospital
gives the MCO.
Second, under arms-length contracting there is the vertical externality characteristic of most
upstream-downstream relations. An upstream provider sets a rate vi that includes a markup over the
provider’s opportunity cost.  That markup is compounded when the downstream insurer—the MCO—
offers a premium p(j;k’)  that includes a markup over its costs.
The detrimental effect that these externalities have on net revenues of providers and MCOs is
greater the higher is b (and so the more differentiated are the MCOs) with the result that the detrimental
externalities eventually offset the increased monopoly power that a higher b gives the MCOs.
Our analysis abstracts from efficiency and quality coordination issues arising from separate
physician and hospital organizations.  As a result, the coordination failures among upstream providers and
between the upstream providers and downstream insurers stem entirely from strategic pricing effects.
Since we are assuming constant marginal costs for a given quality of care, health care purchasers and
therefore consumers benefit whenever provider fees and MCO premiums decline.  The analysis therefore
suggests that a form of provider alliance or integration that helps to overcome pricing coordination
failures might have efficiency benefits above and beyond those associated with economies of scope in
outpatient and inpatient delivery.
Note also that the welfare-decreasing coordination failures in this model are not attributable to the
assumed capitation payment of providers, but arise from any decentralized pricing of the complementary,
specialized upstream inputs to health care. That is, given that there are no adverse (or beneficial) incentive
effects of provider risk-bearing in our analysis, the same results hold under fee-for-service payment, or
indeed under any mixed form of provider payment (see Appendix A).13
4. Physician-Hospital Alliances
An alliance between physicians and hospitals is one way that the two upstream providers can
coordinate the rates set for their complementary services.  For example, a physician group and a hospital
can coordinate the discounts that they offer a health plan. To the extent that alliances internalize the
horizontal pricing externality under arms-length contracting, alliances should lead to lower cost or lower
premiums for a given quality of care.  Furthermore the lower premiums should increase access as
compared to arms-length contracting.  This provides an important offsetting influence to the impact that
provider integration is usually feared to have.
We analyze one example of provider alliances, a network of physician-hospital organizations.
These kinds of networks are increasingly common in many parts of the US.  Cuellar and Gertler (2001)
note that “by 1998, 66 percent of hospitals had either acquired or formed a long-term contract with one or
more physician organizations” (p.1).
11  The majority of such organizations are non-exclusive (ibid). We
therefore assume that alliances are “open”; each physician group j is in separate alliances with each
hospital k.  Figure 3 illustrates such a market structure: Figure 3(a) shows the alliances to which physician
group 1 belongs and 3(b) the alliances to which hospital 1¢ belongs.
(Insert Figure 3 near here)
Even though the MCOs are now purchasing from a physician-hospital alliance, they still must
compete with other MCOs for enrollees, and so the second stage subgame – equation (2) - is unchanged.
Of course, the outcome of the second stage is affected by changes in provider payments arising from the
alliance.  Specifically the net revenue of each alliance (j,k) is:
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) v p* ) ; ( ) ; ( k j k j k j q v v + = p j ˛ {1,2}; k ˛ {1¢, 2¢}
                                                                
11 Through an empirical study of such alliances in three states, Cuellar and Gertler (2001) find that hospitals in
markets with high managed care penetration, and with high managed care growth, are predicted to form alliances.
Such strategic hospital-physician alliances take many forms, ranging from loose contracting alliances and open
physician-hospital organizations to closed physician-hospital organizations and fully integrated models.14
We assume that the physician group and hospital share this profit equally—the Nash bargaining
solution for this symmetric game between the members of the alliance.  Thus, in stage one, physician
group j chooses vj to maximize its group’s share of net revenues from its two alliances with hospitals:
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Similarly each hospital chooses vk to maximize net revenue from membership in its two physician-
hospital alliances. The solution to this set of joint maximization problems determines the equilibrium
provider capitation rates that a downstream MCO faces when setting its premiums.
Given our symmetry assumptions, these capitation rates are identical for physicians and hospitals,
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Substituting these provider payments into the reaction functions for downstream insurer premiums gives
the Nash equilibrium MCO premiums:
(10) ( )
( )( ) 3 32 32 3 8
27 116 96 2
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k j p (j ˛ {1,2}; k ˛ {1¢, 2¢})
As before, the Nash equilibrium premiums and provider payments are increasing functions of the
perceived degree of differentiation among MCOs. Moreover, as  bﬁ0, 0 ﬁ
A
) k ; j (
A
u p , v , just as in the
decentralized case.  By contrast, as b ﬁ ¥, the equilibrium provider capitation rates  4 1 ﬁ
A
u v  and the
equilibrium MCO premiums  4 3 ﬁ
A
) k ; j ( p .
It is easy to show by comparing (5), (6), (9) and (10) that the network of provider alliances leads
to lower provider payments and lower MCO premiums than decentralized, arms-length contracting. These
lower premiums lead to greater access.  The combined effect is that, except under the most competitive
conditions (low  b) insurance costs are generally higher with the network of alliances than with15
decentralized rate setting primarily because there are more insured enrollees as compared to the
decentralized benchmark: see Figure 7 below. In other words, by coordinating the pricing of
complementary medical care services, physician-hospital alliances can benefit payers and consumers,
even if facilities are not integrated and no economies of scope are realized in patient care.
The network of physician-hospital alliances considered here removes some but not all of the
coordination failures between physician groups, inpatient services and MCOs.  The only way to remove
all the horizontal and vertical externalities is to have all the physician groups and hospitals fully
coordinate their payment rates. For example, when all the upstream providers form a provider consortium,
they can overcome the pricing coordination failures by charging a two-part tariff that extends their
monopoly power to the downstream MCO market.
12  Acting as a monopoly, the consortium maximizes its
net revenues by charging a capitation rate that maximizes the MCOs’ net revenues, because this strategy
permits the consortium to set the highest fixed tariff and appropriate the entire downstream surplus of the
MCOs.
13
Interestingly, a provider consortium can sometimes provide greater access (through lower
premiums) than either decentralized pricing or a network of provider alliances. This occurs when payers
and consumers do not switch readily among plans (high b): see Figure 7 below.  In this situation, and in
the absence of a consortium, the upstream providers fight over the high surplus associated with each
MCO’s relatively captive clientele. The resulting pricing coordination failures lead to higher premiums
and less access. Whether the potential efficiency benefit from provider consolidation outweighs the
anticompetitive effects of consolidation is an interesting and unresolved question.
14
                                                                
12 Details of the provider consortium market structure equations are available from the authors upon request, and are
included in the Mathematica file publicly available at http://www.tufts.edu/~gnorman/.
13 Unlike the other market structures that we consider, under a provider consortium total enrollment and total
premium costs do not vary with the perceived substitutability between health plans, because under this structure the
real “power” rests with the monopoly upstream providers, not downstream plans.
14 The Department of Justice has brought actions against physician-hospital organizations in several cases, alleging
that provider integration was anti-competitive. For example, a physician-hospital organization in St. Joseph,
Missouri linked 85 percent of the physicians in the county with the monopoly hospital in St. Joseph. In Danbury,
Connecticut, the only hospital established a physician-hospital organization with 98 percent of physicians on its
staff, members of the Danbury Area IPA.  Both of these antitrust cases resemble the case of a full consortium of all
providers, and the antitrust concern regarding anticompetitive effects seems justified (Simpson and Coate 1998;16
5. Vertical Integration Among Providers and Managed Care Plans
Our model of bilateral market power creates the incentive for providers and MCOs to consider
partial vertical integration short of a full consortium. Figure 4 illustrates such a partially vertically
integrated health care market. Physician group 1 and hospital 1 ¢ form one integrated MCO [1;1¢], and
physician group 2 and hospital 2¢ form a competing integrated MCO [2;2¢]. Throughout our analysis of
this case we assume that there is no strategic attempt at vertical foreclosure. Rather, the integrated MCOs
allow their providers to accept contracts with other, non-integrated MCOs, which could be managed
indemnity plans.
15  However, we should expect to find that the contract terms (i.e., provider capitation
rates) are not as favorable for non-integrated MCOs as for the integrated MCOs. Denote then by vj and vk
the rates paid by non-integrated downstream insurers for health services j and k, and denote by v(i;i¢) (i = 1,
2) the rates for the services provided internally to the integrated MCOs so that now we have v = (v1, v2,
v1¢, v2¢, v(1;1’), v(2;2’)).
(Insert Figure 4 near here)
In the second stage of the game, both the integrated and non-integrated MCOs set their premiums
*
) ; ( k j p  to satisfy:
(11a) ( )( ) { } ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( max arg i i i i i i i i v p q p ¢ ¢ ¢
*
¢ - = p (i = 1, 2)
(11b) ( )( ) { } h i h i h i h i v v p q p ¢ ¢ ¢
*
¢ - - = ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( max arg p (i, h = 1,2; i „ h)
The outcome of the premium setting game in stage 2 depends upon the capitation rates set in
stage 1. The capitation rates in turn are determined by how the integrated MCOs are internally organized.
We analyze three different internal organizations of integrated MCOs, differing in the degree of provider
autonomy that they allow. First, with centralized integration health care providers have no pricing
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Gaynor and Vogt 2000).  Consistent with this, Halvorson (1999) reports that “when almost all of the oncology
groups in one local market merged into a single group, the [price] of one-hour chemotherapy jumped 51
percent…[and that of] a hospital follow-up visit jumped 20 percent” (p.28). Cuellar and Gertler (2001) find that
physician-hospital organizations, particularly closed or exclusive forms, use market power to gain managed care
contracts on better terms, with little evidence of cost efficiencies or improved quality of care17
autonomy, and are paid by the integrated MCO at their opportunity or marginal cost. We call this insurer-
dominated MCO a  staff-model HMO.  The second form gives health care providers slightly more
autonomy. Providers constitute a separate entity or division within the MCO, and their capitation rates are
set to maximize the HMO’s total net revenues.  We label this a  group-model HMO. The third
organizational variant again treats the providers as a separate division.  In this variant, however, the
providers have total autonomy to determine what capitation rates to charge to the integrated insurer’s own
enrollees and what rates to offer other insurers contracting with those providers.  The objective of the
providers in this case is to maximize their division’s net revenues.  Although we call this form a Preferred
Provider Organization, it is still a vertically integrated MCO, albeit with a relatively provider-dominated
internal power structure.
The remainder of this section details the resulting equilibrium premiums and capitation rates for
the three different organizational forms.  Comparison of the impact of these three forms on cost and
access is left to section 6.
1. CENTRALIZED  INTEGRATION: A STAFF-MODEL HMO
With a staff-model HMO the insurer employs providers and pays them as employees. We assume
that in this case the insurer squeezes the revenues of the health care providers to the bare minimum, with
the internal capitation rate set equal to expected marginal cost:  v(i;i¢) = rc = 0,  i = 1, 2. However, the
providers may also contract with other non-integrated MCOs, receiving a capitation rate vi, which is set
by the HMO. Total net revenue for the HMO is, therefore, total premium revenue,  ( ) ( ) ( ) v p v * ) ; ( ) ; ( i i i i q p ¢
*
¢
plus any revenues from providing services to other plans’ enrollees ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) v p v p * * ; ) ; ( i h i h i i q v q v ¢ ¢ ¢ + ).
In reality, the latter term is often negligible for staff-model HMOs, since staff providers primarily treat
only HMO enrollees. To allow a “fair” comparison with the two other forms that do allow providers more
autonomy, however, we include net revenues from provider outside contracts as part of staff-model HMO
total revenues.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
15  We can show that this assumption is innocuous in that “no foreclosure” is a weakly dominant strategy for the18
In the first stage of the game, each integrated HMO [i;i’] sets the provider payment rates vi and vi¢
charged to other insurers to maximize:
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] v * p v * p v * p v i h i h i i i i i i
HMO S




¢ + + = P ; ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; (    i, h = 1,2; i „ h
subject to the constraint v(i;i¢) = 0, i = 1, 2. The equilibrium premiums for the staff-model HMOs and the
non-integrated MCOs, and the capitation rates charged to the non-integrated MCOs are derived in
Appendix B.
As in the previous cases, both premiums and provider payments are increasing functions of the
degree of perceived differentiation among insurers. When consumers are reluctant to switch between
plans, plans can charge higher premiums. Since the integrated HMOs control all providers, market power
also allows them to charge higher capitation rates to non-integrated plans contracting with their providers.
It follows that the non-integrated plans are at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the integrated HMOs
because they must contract with the HMO providers on less favorable contract terms. As a result, their
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A natural question to ask, therefore, is whether the non-integrated MCOs can survive.  We can
show (see Appendix B) that when downstream insurers are not very differentiated and competition among
the non-integrated MCOs and integrated HMOs is intense—i.e., when b < 0.0297—the provider payment
rates set by the competing HMOs for contracting with non-integrated insurers are such that the non-
integrated insurers cannot in equilibrium attract positive enrollments. In other words, non-integrated
insurers experience an instantaneous “premium death spiral” and exit the market. Since the HMOs are not
deliberately attempting to foreclose by refusing to allow their providers to contract with other insurers, we
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
vertically integrated MCOs: details can be obtained from the authors on request.19
refer to this outcome as non-predatory vertical foreclosure. Such foreclosure arises naturally from the
extremely competitive nature of the insurance market at such low values of b.
2. A NONEXCLUSIVE GROUP-MODEL HMO
The major difference between the group-model HMO and the staff-model HMO is that with the
group model the providers have the autonomy to set internal payment rates that are no longer constrained
to equal marginal cost. Specifically, we assume that the internal hospital and physician group forms an
upstream provider group with primary responsibility for delivering health services to the HMO’s
enrollees for which the HMO pays the providers a capitation rate v(i;i¢).
The HMO-provider group relationship, however, is not exclusive, so that HMO providers can
contract with other insurers to provide physician and inpatient services to their enrollees as well.  The
providers charge vj and vk to the non-integrated plans for their services. The revenues from these contracts
accrue to the HMO, which in turn allocates a portion of the total HMO net revenues to the provider group.
It follows that with the group-model HMO everyone in the HMO aims to maximize the net revenues of
the entire HMO, which consist of the premium revenues from the HMO’s own enrollees and the provider
payments made by non-integrated plans to the HMO’s providers. In other words, with such a non-
exclusive group-model HMO, payment rates v(i;i¢), vj and vk are set to maximize the HMO’s net revenue:
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] v p v p v p v * * * ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( i i i h i i i i i i
HMO G
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The equilibrium premiums and capitation rates are again detailed in Appendix B. As with the
staff-model HMO, the providers in a group-model HMO charge higher payment rates when contracting
out to other insurers than when serving the HMO’s own enrollees. With a group model, however, there is
a non-monotonic relationship between the internal provider payment rate v(i;i¢) and the degree of perceived
differentiation among the downstream insurers.  The provider group payments for serving the HMO’s
enrollees are low when the HMO faces stiff competition for enrollees (b near zero) and initially those
payments increase as premium competition softens. However, for high degrees of HMO market power,20




) i ; i ( v .  In other
words, when the group-model HMO faces very little competition for enrollees, its monopoly position
translates into monopsony power. To maximize net revenue its provider group acts much like the on-staff
providers of a staff-model HMO.  In the more typical case where HMOs face competition in the insurance
market, a group-model HMO benefits from keeping some degree of vertical separation between its
provider group and insurance administration.  Setting an internal capitation rate  v(i;i¢)  > 0 softens
competition in the downstream insurance market, benefiting the HMO even though this introduces a
vertical pricing externality (double marginalization) between the providers and the insurance division.
As with the staff-model HMO, we find that when the downstream insurance market is extremely
competitive, the non-integrated insurers will exit the market.  The threshold perceived degree of
differentiation for this to happen with the group-model structure is, however, lower than with the staff-
model HMO: b < 0.0175 in the latter case as compared to b < 0.0297 in the former.
3. A VERTICALLY INTEGRATED PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATION
We model a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) as a vertically integrated health insurer that
allows providers to retain significantly more autonomy than under either HMO model. One could also
think of this case as a provider-sponsored HMO. The distinction between the PPO and HMO in this
context is not, as traditionally understood, the degree of consumer choice among providers (which is
similarly restricted in all of our forms). Rather it is the autonomy and “power” of providers vis-à-vis the
insurance administration. Among the vertically integrated forms, the PPO embodies maximum provider
autonomy.
We assume that the PPO’s physician group and hospital act as a divisional profit center, setting
the contract terms for the PPO’s enrollees and for contracting to serve other insurers’ patients, with the
aim of maximizing their (the PPO providers’) division’s net revenues. This implies that in the first stage
of the game, the payment rates v(i;i¢), vj and vk are set to maximize provider net revenues:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) v p v p v p * * * ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( i h i h i i i i i i
PPO
i i q v q v q v ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ + + = P       i, h = 1,2; i „ h21
We show in Appendix B that providers within the PPO discriminate against other employers of
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0, the PPO never adopts marginal-cost pricing of provider services. For less competitive insurance
markets, when payers and enrollees are “sticky” in their health care choices and view different providers
as highly differentiated (b ﬁ ¥), PPO providers act like monopolists.  Provider payments  2 1 ﬁ ¢
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With the PPO organizational form, the premiums charged are such that non-integrated insurers
are never driven from the market, regardless of the degree of competition among MCOs. Nevertheless,
the PPOs always enjoy a competitive advantage over non-integrated insurers by virtue of the discounted
provider payment rates that they are charged by the provider “division”. As  b  ﬁ  ¥ we have
. p ; p
MCO
) h ; i (
PPO
) i ; i ( 6 5 4 3 ﬁ ﬁ ¢ ¢
6. Comparing the Different Organizational Structures
The premiums charged and access to health care that results from competition among managed
care organizations are determined by the precise manner in which the MCOs and the health care providers
structure their relationships.
Consider first the market structures that we have just analyzed, in which some insurers are
vertically integrated with their providers and other insurers negotiate arms-length contracts with
providers.  A simple relationship characterizes the resulting equilibrium health insurance premiums as
illustrated in Figure 5. In every case premiums increase with b, but relative premiums are determined by
the organizational structure of the integrated HMOs or PPOs. Staff-model HMOs yield the lowest
premiums, somewhat higher premiums result from group-model HMOs, and the highest premiums from
PPOs.  These differences in premiums derive directly from the very different internal and external
capitation rates that the integrated MCOs charge.  Capitation rates are lowest with the staff-model HMO22
because the internal capitation rate is set at marginal cost, putting severe constraints on the rates that can
be charged to the non-integrated MCOs.  They are highest with the PPO where the providers’ concern
with their divisional net revenues leads them to set relatively high internal, and so external, capitation
rates.
(Insert Figure 5 near here)
It follows that net revenues for the non-integrated MCOs are similarly determined by the
organizational structure of the integrated MCOs, as can be seen from Figure 6a.   Competition from the
integrated firms is toughest with the staff-model HMOs precisely because their insurance divisions obtain
provider services at marginal cost and softest with the PPOs because the insurance divisions now face
relatively high internal capitation rates. As a consequence, the net revenues of non-integrated insurers are
lowest when competing with staff-model HMOs and highest when competing with looser PPO-form
health plans.
The net revenues of the integrated MCOs also depend on their organizational form, but the
relationship is not as straightforward, as can be seen from Figure 6b.  Note first that net revenues are
subject to the same countervailing forces as the decentralized benchmark and the network alliances.  On
the one hand a high b confers stronger monopoly power, raising net revenues.  On the other hand, high b
worsens the revenue-destroying effects of coordination failures that even partial vertical integration only
partially corrects.
In comparing the impact of organizational structure on net revenues, note first that the group-
model HMO always outperforms the staff-model HMO.  This is the direct result of the fact that the only
difference between these two forms in our analysis is that with the staff-model HMO the providers are
constrained to price internally at marginal cost while with the group-model no such constraint is imposed.
Removing a constraint on internal pricing will always result in an increase in net revenues.
The relative profitability (net revenues) of PPOs and staff- and group-model HMOs is rather more
complicated, being determined by the competitiveness of the health insurance market, i.e., the degree to
which payers and/or consumers consider MCOs to be differentiated. Downstream competition is softer23
with PPOs than with either a staff-model or group-model HMO because PPOs set the highest internal and
external capitation rates.  On the other hand, the PPO suffers more from coordination failures, in
particular double marginalization, than either type of integrated HMO.  As we have seen, coordination
failures are magnified when b is high.  By contrast, when  b is low the ability of the PPO to soften
downstream competition for enrollees is more important. In competitive markets, PPOs are most
profitable, despite the efficiency losses from double marginalization. Premium competition among less
differentiated PPOs is softer than for similarly differentiated HMOs, because PPOs face higher provider
payment rates.
(Insert Figure 6 near here)
This is consistent with the rise of PPOs and other looser forms of managed care (such as Point Of
Service [POS] plans) as managed care penetration increased and health insurance markets became more
competitive. The prediction from our analysis that staff-model HMOs are less profitable than group-
model HMOs or PPOs is also consistent with several empirical observations about staff-model HMOs.
The first managed care plans in the US tended to be of this form, and were predominantly non-profit.
Integrated, salary-model physician-hospital organizations, which often accept global capitation contracts
and therefore resemble staff-model HMOs, seem to differ in many dimensions from other physician-
hospital organizations (Cuellar and Gertler 2001). They are more likely to be non-profit, feature teaching
hospitals, integrate independent of the degree of managed care penetration, show quality improvements
without charging higher prices, and increase the amount of uncompensated care after integration.
In Figure 7 we compare how the different relations among insurers and health care providers
affect access to health care, where access is defined as total enrollment in the downstream market. Arms-
length contracting or decentralized pricing delivers lower access because pricing coordination failures
under decentralized pricing lead to higher premiums, and so to lower overall enrollment. The pricing
coordination failures are more acute at high levels of differentiation among the MCOs, with the result that
the gap between access under decentralized pricing and other organizational forms widens as b increases.24
More generally, access is always negatively related to b for all the cases that we have considered with the
exception of the upstream provider consortium.  As a consequence, for b > 0.602 the consortium provides
greater access than any other organization of health care.  In the absence of a full provider consortium, the
typical ranking of the different organizational cases, in terms of access is, from highest to lowest: Staff-
model HMO – Group-model HMO – Physician/Hospital Alliance – PPO – Decentralized.
16
The clear implication is that access is positively affected by those organizational structures that
give some weight to what is happening in the downstream MCO market, such as the two types of HMO
or the alliance.  These structures, by at least partially internalizing the coordination failures, put
downward pressure on capitation rates and so lead to lower premiums and greater access in the
downstream MCO market. By contrast, with the decentralized benchmark and the PPO, much more
weight is given to the upstream provider market, leading to higher capitation rates and lower downstream
access.
(Insert Figure 7 near here)
The impact of organizational structure on access also shows up in a comparison of total health
care costs, as illustrated in Figure 8. Since the costs here include only those covered by insurance and
ignore costs of the uninsured, low access translates into low total costs. Not surprisingly then, the total
monopoly power exercised by a provider consortium leads to this being the most costly organizational
form for any value of b.  The low total costs of the PPO and of the decentralized benchmark at other than
very low values of b arise primarily because the high capitation rates under these two arrangements lead
to high premiums that choke off demand. By contrast, the higher total costs of the physician/hospital
alliances, the group-model HMO and the staff-model HMO arise primarily because the low capitation
rates that these schemes generate translate into low premiums, encouraging enrollment in their health care
plans.
(Insert Figure 8 near here)
                                                                
16  There are some exceptions to this ranking in that the alliance outperforms the Group-HMO if b < 0.114 and the25
In summary, the premiums that organized purchasers of health care or their beneficiaries must
pay, and the net revenues of insurers and providers differ in interesting but not always straightforward
ways across the different market structures that we have considered.  This is summarized in Table 1.
Conclusion
Recent empirical studies in health care point to the need for a model of bilateral market power
between health plans and provider organizations. This paper has developed a model of bilateral oligopoly
that is relevant to the health care industry, and uses it to analyze the impact on cost and access of
alternative contractual relationships between MCOs and their providers. In our analysis the health plans
differentiate themselves through distinct, albeit overlapping, provider networks of specialized,
complementary inputs (physician groups and hospitals).  We have identified the subgame perfect strategic
pricing equilibria for a range of possible contractual relationships between the upstream providers and the
downstream insurers, including a network of provider alliances, a provider consortium, and partial
vertical integration with group- or staff-model HMOs or PPOs.
Our analysis shows that premium competition among MCOs depends upon the vertical relations
between the upstream providers and the downstream MCOs, and upon the degree to which consumers
perceive the competing MCOs to be offering differentiated services.  But this is a two-way street.  In
other words, an immediate implication of our analysis is that we should also find a relationship between
competition in the downstream market and the type of organizational structure that health care providers
and insurers are likely to adopt.  The endogenous determination of market structure is a complicated
matter that would take us too far afield here but some brief remarks are in order.  Simply put, we should
expect to find more decentralized structures when downstream competition is tough – because the
insurers are not seen as being highly differentiated.  By contrast, more integrated structures are likely to
arise when the degree of perceived differentiation is high, and the downstream competition is softer.
There is then the related implication, of course, that providers and insurers have an interest in trying to
increase the perceived degree of differentiation between them.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
decentralized structure outperforms the PPO for b < 0.072.26
Our results highlight that different contractual relationships do not merely redistribute a fixed
surplus among providers, plans and consumers, but that contractual and organizational form affects total
surplus. A key insight is that a decentralized market structure, with physicians and hospitals setting
independent payment rates, gives rise to inefficiencies from pricing coordination failures.  These
coordination failures raise premiums, lower access and lower provider and MCO net revenues. Forms of
integration that overcome pricing coordination failures can lower premiums and benefit consumers. This
is consistent with the empirical literature on managed care. The lower premiums charged by MCOs
compared to indemnity insurance stem only partly from favorable selection or differential quality. A large
part of the premium differences can be traced to lower MCO payments for hospital and physician services
(e.g., Cutler, McClellan and Newhouse 2000).
Another insight of our analysis is that the relationship between market power and net revenues is
non-monotonic.  Providers and MCOs do not achieve maximum net revenue when they are monopolies or
monopsonies, but rather at an intermediate level of market power. Our analysis also predicts that access,
cost, and net revenues depends on the internal structure of MCOs, especially the extent to which providers
have autonomy in setting payment rates to maximize their own net revenues.
It is clear that much remains to be done in this important area.  Because total market access to
health coverage and the costs of care differ significantly under different market organizations, bilateral
market power is a central issue to consider in the design and enforcement of policies ranging from
regulation of managed care to antitrust policy.  In addition, as we have noted above, more work is needed
to identify what relationships between plans and providers are most likely to emerge in different market
settings, and more generally, in making market structure endogenous. Moreover, because perceived
differentiation among MCOs affects the revenues of insurers and providers in important ways, there will
be incentives for these health care groups to engage in activities that affect differentiation. Finally,
extending our framework to examine issues of economies of scope and enrollee selection (particularly
when enrollees value provider choice and valuation of choice is correlated with health cost risk) is left to
future research.27
Appendix A: Fee-for-service and Mixed Payment
In this appendix, we illustrate how the model can easily capture alternative provider payment
methods. Consider FFS payment of providers. In the first stage, each physician group negotiates a fee
schedule with an MCO characterized by an average fee per service of wj. Similarly, each hospital
negotiates a fee per service (e.g., per diem payment or fee schedule) with an average fee of wk.
In the second stage, MCOs set premiums to maximize premium revenues net of FFS payments to
providers:
(A-1) ( ) ( ) { } p ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( max arg k j k j k j k j q w w p p r - r - =
* (j ˛ {1,2}; k ˛ {1¢, 2¢})
) ( where k j jk w w p + r ‡
The set of equilibrium premiums p*(w) from the second stage subgame of price competition
among MCOs identifies the derived demand function  ( ) w
*
j x  that each physician group j faces in the first
stage of the game. Each hospital k derives its input demand function  ( ) w
*
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derived demand is:
(A-2)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) w p w p w









) ; 2 ( ) ; 1 (





(j ˛ {1,2}; k ˛ {1¢, 2¢})
In the first stage of the game, providers choose their prices to maximize net revenues in light of
the resulting demand for their services:
(A-3) ( ) w
* - r = P u u u
D
u x c w ) ( ( } 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 { ¢ ¢ ˛ u )
where  u u c w ‡ .
Providers clearly have an incentive to increase the fee per service and the volume of services
provided, but they face a trade-off between these two components of net revenue.  Higher fees translate
into higher costs for the downstream insurer and higher premiums, leading to lower enrollments and
lower patient volume for upstream providers.  In contracting with MCOs, then, providers may accept
discounted fee-for-service payment (lower w) in exchange for higher patient volume (higher  x r ).
17
                                                                
17 Indeed, discounted FFS continues to be a common form of provider payment under managed care.  In 1999,
although almost 91 percent of physicians had managed-care contracts, mean practice revenue from capitation
represented only 7.4 percent of revenue among all physicians, and 21 percent of practice revenue among physicians
with capitation contracts (Dudley and Luft 2001).28
Solving the first-order conditions from (A-3) gives the Nash equilibrium fees charged by each
physician group and each hospital. We focus on the symmetric case of equal marginal costs, normalized
to zero. Then the equilibrium provider fees for physician groups and hospitals paid discounted FFS by
MCOs are given by:
(A-4) ( )
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Substituting (A-4) into the reaction functions for downstream MCO premiums gives the Nash equilibrium
premiums:
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The equilibrium FFS provider fees corresponding to the capitation payments we derive in the
paper can be found simply by dividing the capitation rate v by r. The intuition is that FFS providers paid
a fee exceeding marginal cost seek to maximize volume of services, and a lower incidence of illness
(lower r) among the enrollees they are contracted to serve lowers volume.  Providers offer less of a FFS
discount to MCOs that give them lower patient volume, and a larger discount to MCOs bringing in higher
volume. Therefore, the provider fee is inversely related to  r.
A mixed payment system with some weight on capitation payment and a complementary weight
on FFS could be used, with the weights varying by provider (e.g., capitation for physician groups [sj=1]
and discounted FFS for hospitals [sk=0]):
(A-6) [ ] ( ) ( ) { } p ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( max arg k j k k j j k k j j k j k j q w s w s v s v s p p - + - r - - - =
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Under our assumptions, which abstract from the efficiency impact of alternative provider
payment methods, the downstream premiums do not depend on the degree of supply-side cost sharing for
physicians, sj, or hospitals, sk. MCO premiums, MCO and provider profits, total enrollee costs and access
are identical for FFS and capitation payment (and any form of mixed payment).  For simplicity, the paper
presents the model assuming pure capitation payment (sj = sk = 1).29
Appendix B: Partial Vertical Integration
The partially vertically integrated market structure involves six kinds of provider payment rates.
First there are the rates vj and vk at which the providers sell their specialized medical services j and k to
non-integrated downstream insurers.  Then there are the rates  v(i;;i¢) ( i = 1, 2) for the inpatient and
physician services sold internally to the integrated MCOs.  In the second stage, both the integrated and
non-integrated insurers choose their premiums 
*
) ; ( k j p .
In the downstream insurance market, the integrated and non-integrated MCOs set premiums
according to:
(B-1a) ( )( ) { } ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( max arg i i i i i i i i v p q p ¢ ¢ ¢
*
¢ - = p (i = 1, 2)
(B-1b) ( )( ) { } h i h i h i h i v v p q p ¢ ¢ ¢
*
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Each insurer's solution to its maximization problem yields a best response function in premiums from
which the equilibrium premiums  ( ) ( ) { } v v p
* * = ) ; ( k j p  can be found, where now v = (v(1;1¢), v(2;2¢), v1, v2,  v1¢,
v2¢).
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CENTRALIZED  INTEGRATION: A STAFF-MODEL HMO
Recall that in the first stage of the game, the HMO [i; i¢] chooses provider payment rates vi and vi¢
charged to other insurers to maximize the HMO’s net revenue:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) v p v p v p v * * * ; ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( i h i h i i i i i i
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subject to the constraint v(i;i¢) = 0 (i = 1, 2).
Solving the resulting reaction functions gives the equilibrium provider payments that the HMO
will require if other insurers wish to contract with the HMO’s hospital and physician group:
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Substituting these payment rates into the reaction functions for MCO premiums yields the Nash
equilibrium premiums which hold for b > 0.0297:
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With non-predatory vertical foreclosure (see discussion in text), eliminating insurers (1;2¢) and
(2;1¢) and solving the reaction functions for HMOs [1;1¢] and [2;2¢] gives the Nash equilibrium premiums
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A NONEXCLUSIVE GROUP-MODEL HMO
Under a non-exclusive group-model HMO, payment rates v(i;i¢), vj and vk are also set to maximize
the HMO’s net revenue:
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only difference from a staff-model HMO is the assumption that payment rates can now differ from
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The equilibrium premiums resulting from competition among two group-model HMOs and two non-
integrated insurers are:
(B-5a) ( )( )
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) ; ( 1536 2304 896 51
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b + b + b +
b + b + b
= ¢
MCO
h i p (i, h = 1, 2;  i „ h)
In the range of b < 0.0175, when health plans are viewed as almost perfect substitutes, the Nash
equilibrium provider payments v(i;i¢) are:
(B-6)
( )( )
2 ) ; ( 16 12 1 2 1
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i i v for b < 0.0175 (i = 1, 2)
The Nash equilibrium premiums for the two remaining HMOs become:
(B-7) ( )
( )
2 ) ; ( 16 12 1
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i i p   for b < 0.0175 (i = 1, 2)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
18 See the appendix to Pepall and Norman (2001) for derivation of such an equilibrium.31
A VERTICALLY INTEGRATED PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATION
Recall that for a PPO in the first stage of the game, the payment rates v(i;i¢),  vj and vk are set to
maximize provider revenues:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) v p v p v p * * * ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( i h i h i i i i i i
PPO
i i q v q v q v ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ + + = P       (i, h = 1,2; i „ h).
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144 172 39 8
b + b + b +
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) ; ( 64 60 3 8 3 3
320 380 87 4
b + b + b +
b + b + b
= ¢
MCO
h i p (i, h = 1, 2;  i „ h)32
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Figure 1: The Upstream and Downstream Market for Health Care Services
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Figure 3: Overlapping Provider Alliances: Non-exclusive Physician-Hospital Organizations
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Figure 4: Partial Vertical Integration
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Figure 5: Insurance Premiums with Partial Vertical Integration37
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Figure 6: Net Revenues with Partial Vertical Integration38
Figure 7: Access (Total Enrollment) under Different Organizational Forms

































Figure 8: Cost (Total Spending) under Different Organizational Forms
































Table 1: Comparison of Premiums, Provider Payments, and Net Revenues
Premiums
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* * * > > p p p    for 0.562 < b
Notes: 
1 The net revenue of an integrated MCO is the combined net revenue of the MCO insurer
and its two upstream providers, i.e., the MCO’s physician group and hospital.41WORKING PAPER SERIES 2002
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